

# MEDVEDEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A PAN- EUROPEAN SECURITY PACT

## ITS SIX HIDDEN OBJECTIVES AND HOW THE WEST SHOULD RESPOND

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### **Abstract**

*Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has proposed to organize a conference on a new European Security Treaty. The author analyzes six hidden objectives of this proposal. These are, first, to introduce China as a countervailing extra-European power alongside the US; second, to raise the profile of the CSTO, the 'mini-Warsaw Pact' led by Moscow; third, to divide NATO; fourth to bind NATO; fifth to claim a Russian Monroe doctrine for its Near Abroad; and sixth, to undermine existing European security treaties, such as the OSCE and the CFE Treaty. The author seeks to formulate how the West should respond.*

### **Introduction**

During a speech, made in Berlin on June 5, 2008, before an audience of five hundred politicians and business leaders, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed a new security treaty for Europe. "Our predecessors during the Cold War years," said Medvedev, "managed to draw up the Helsinki Final Act (...), and so why should we not be able to take the next step today? Namely, drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organizations currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties." This new pact would be, according to him, "a regional pact based, naturally, on the principles of the UN Charter and clearly defining the importance of force as factor in relations within the Euro-Atlantic community."(1) Although Medvedev provided some more details in a speech on October 8, 2008 at the World Policy Conference in the French city of Evian(2), his proposal remains rather vague. NATO members, the EU countries, the members of the OSCE, and – what would be a *novum*: China – would all be invited to the conference, which is to take place in Moscow.

## **A Place for China at a European Negotiating Table?**

An invitation for China to participate at a conference on *Euro-Atlantic* security, may seem, at first sight, rather strange. The Russians could argue, however, that also OSCE countries, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are also fully fledged Asian countries and that this does not exclude them from participating in the OSCE, an organization that deals with security and co-operation *in Europe*. But the membership of these countries in a Euro-Atlantic organization is a legacy of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. So why should the Chinese be present?

Some see it as an attempt by Moscow to give the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security organization in which Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are members, an equal say in European affairs with NATO. The American presence in Europe would be balanced by another extra-European power: China. But, at the same time, Russia would not want to grant China too much importance, because the Russian-Chinese partnership possesses a number of ambiguities.

Not only is China's population ten times that of Russia, but China borders also the under-populated and mineral-rich parts of Russia's Far East that were once part of imperial China. Today only 7 million people live in Russia's Far East, while 110 million people live in China's Northern provinces. The Russian government will, therefore, see to it that the central role at this conference will be reserved for its organizer: Russia. Moscow wants to play a similar role in the Russian-Chinese duo as Paris used to play in the French-German tandem in the EU: although smaller and economically weaker, Moscow considers itself the political and military leader of the tandem.

Another objective of Russia could be to raise the profile of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which has its roots in the Commonwealth of Independent States. This 'Mini- Warsaw Pact' in which Russia – in contrast to the SCO - is the uncontested leader and in which seven former Soviet states<sup>(3)</sup> are members, is not only militarily more integrated than the SCO, but it also has an equivalent of NATO's Article 5, defining a mutual defense obligation.<sup>(4)</sup>

## **Dividing NATO?**

A third, hidden objective is *to divide NATO*. Therefore the timing of the initiative is important. Russia presents its proposal at a time that the Bush administration, which is extremely unpopular in Europe, was on its way out, while a new administration in Washington has not yet come into place. And the new American President will need some time to reaffirm the American leadership. Many European NATO allies are disaffected with the Bush Presidency and feel overstretched by the unwinnable guerilla war in Afghanistan. Their response to the Russian occupation of Georgia has

been extremely weak. For Moscow, this situation has opened a window of opportunity. At the moment of the transition of power in Washington, the moral status of the US leadership is at a historic low, while the weakness of the US is aggravated by the turmoil of the global banking crisis. The situation in Europe is not better. The Lisbon Treaty that was expected to give the EU more clout in the field of foreign policy, is in shambles and there is a general feeling of disorientation in Europe as concerns the future and direction of the European project. Moscow knows that its initiative will be met with mistrust by the Baltic states, Poland, and the UK. But it intends to play a subtle game, trying to win support for its plan in the leading European capitals. Even if Medvedev's proposal would *not* lead to a conference, the fact of proposing the plan would, as such, already fulfill one of its objectives: to divide the NATO allies.

### **Binding NATO**

It would not, however, be in Russia's ultimate interest if a division within NATO led the project to be abandoned. This is because the fourth objective of the project is *to bind NATO*. This objective might not be immediately clear, because NATO, as an organization, is not invited to participate. In his Berlin speech Medvedev stated that "absolutely all European countries should take part in this summit as individual countries, leaving aside any allegiances to blocs or other groups." It is the *individual* NATO member states that are invited. NATO, as such, is excluded, because it would give NATO – read, the US – too much influence at the summit. A treaty, signed by the individual countries, might not enable Moscow to block NATO decisions outright, but it would make it easier for her - referring to the text of the treaty – to influence the decision-making process of the Alliance and to even block the *implementation* of decisions. Russia rightly fears that the role of the UN Security Council will diminish in the years to come – a tendency due, not in the last place, to its own obstruction policies and the return to its former Cold War position in the UN of 'Mr. Nyet'. Therefore it wants to build an additional international legal structure for the Euro-Atlantic area in order to bind NATO's hands. It is clear that a humanitarian intervention in order to prevent ethnic cleansing, such as was conducted in 1999 by NATO in Kosovo, would be forbidden under the new treaty.

### **The Briand-Kellogg Pact: A Monroe Doctrine for Russia?**

There is a fifth, hidden, objective that Medvedev's Peace Plan aims to fulfill. This objective, which is probably the most important, is to give Russia a basis in international law in order to claim a Russian variant of the Monroe doctrine, which would be applicable to Russia's Near Abroad. There is a hint of this in Medvedev's Berlin speech where he spoke of a precedent for the treaty on European security that he wanted to be signed. "There were attempts to conclude such an agreement in the past," Medvedev said. "It is enough to recall the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. But that agreement failed to

work and shared the sorry fate of the League of Nations. In today's world, when no one wants war in Europe and we have all been made wiser by the lessons of the twentieth century, such an agreement has a better hope of success." Why did Medvedev single out the Briand-Kellogg Pact to be mentioned as an example of the kind of security treaty he wants? To understand why, we need to take a closer look at the history of this pact.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact, which was signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, was an international treaty providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. It was named after its initiators, the American Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, and the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, and initially signed by the representatives of fifteen nations (which included Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia, four countries, by the way, that the pact did not prevent from soon becoming aggressors). (5) The text of the Pact was of an extreme simplicity. It had only three articles that can be printed on half an A4 page. In Article I the parties declared "that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." In Article II the parties agreed that the solution of all disputes or conflicts "shall never be sought except by pacific means." And in Article III was written that the treaty was open "for adherence by all the other powers of the world." The text was simple, short and... there were no sanctions.

Although the United States was one of the initiators of the Pact, the ratification led to hot debates in the US Senate. One of the crucial questions was how far the Pact could eventually restrict the right of the US to self-defense. In the Senate hearings Secretary of State Kellogg confirmed the vision that "the right to self-defense is not limited to territory in the continental United States (..)"(6) He mentioned Panama. "We have a right to defend our treaty for maintaining the integrity and independence of Panama just as much as we have a right to defend San Francisco or New York." In this context Kellogg came up with the Monroe doctrine: "The Monroe doctrine is simply a doctrine of self-defense.(...) It does not consist of any agreement between the United States and any country in the Western Hemisphere or anywhere else."(7) "The doctrine," he continued, "is not international law but it rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is recognized by international law." "The scope of the doctrine," was, according to him, "strictly limited. It concerns itself only with the occupation of territory in the New World, to the subversion or exclusion of a preexisting American government."(8) This debate in the US Senate, in which American politicians expressed their concern that a ratification of the Briand-Kellogg Pact could interfere with the US Monroe Doctrine, is of great

importance. If not an explicit, then, in any case, an *implicit* recognition of some kind of a *Russian* Monroe doctrine is namely at the heart of Medvedev's proposal.

### **A Security Pact inspired by Carl Schmitt?**

And here enters Carl Schmitt, the leading legal expert of Nazi Germany, who, in recent years, has become an important source of inspiration for the leadership in the Kremlin. For Carl Schmitt the Monroe doctrine was the centerpiece of his theory of *Großraumordnung*, 'the order of the Great Area'. It is the doctrine that great powers have the right to claim an exclusive *droit de regard* vis-à-vis the smaller surrounding countries.(9) Schmitt wanted to construct a legal basis in international law for such a zone of influence for Nazi Germany. According to him "in the big world every real Reich has claimed for itself such an area of its 'spatial sovereignty' (*Raumhoheit*) that exceeds its national frontiers." (10) This 'spatial sovereignty' of the *Reich* was not only in flagrant contradiction with the national sovereignty of its smaller neighboring states, it equally implied that any intervention in this space by foreign powers (*raumfremde Mächte*) was forbidden.

The Monroe doctrine, however, was a defensive doctrine, which was formulated in response to the threat that the conservative European monarchies of the 'Holy Alliance' could install conservative monarchies on the American continent. It was – apart from a short period (11) - not an offensive doctrine on the basis of which the US could claim the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the other American nations. Carl Schmitt wanted to re-organize the system of international law in such a way that not the national states, but the different 'Great Areas' would be the organizing elements. This would take away the clear difference between internal policy and foreign policy that characterizes the system of independent states. With the introduction of the concept of the *Reich* this difference would disappear: foreign policy was at the same time internal policy.(12) In practice this meant that the *Reich* had the right to interfere in the smaller neighboring states. And here the circle is closed. Carl Schmitt's popularity in Russia is due to the fact that his theories come close to the 'Brezhnev doctrine' of 'restricted sovereignty'(13) for the countries in the sphere of influence of Soviet Russia.

### **Burying Helsinki: The Anti-OSCE Focus of Medvedev's Peace Plan**

There is a last, sixth, hidden objective of Medvedev's proposal. It is to emasculate existing security arrangements, such as the OSCE and the CFE Treaty. Moscow considers the OSCE to be obsolete. In his Berlin speech Medvedev said: "An organization such as the OSCE could, it would seem, embody European civilization's newfound unity, but it is prevented from doing so, prevented from becoming a full-fledged general regional organization. The problem is not just in the organization's own

incomplete institutional development but also in the obstruction created by other groups intent on continuing the old line of bloc politics.”(14) The remark on ‘obstruction created by other groups’ is, at least, a bit strange if we take into account a series of incidents created by the Russian government, such as the refusal to grant in time the required number of visas for OSCE observers, who would monitor the Russian Presidential elections on March 2, 2008, a refusal which led the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE to cancel the monitoring process.

This incident was more than just obstruction: it was aimed at a gradual sidelining of the OSCE. This policy was not new, but started earlier with Russian attacks on the Warsaw based ODIHR because of its critical stance on the election process in former Soviet republics. In September 2007 Russia and the other CSTO member governments proposed measures to weaken the ODIHR’s ability to monitor elections. OSCE election missions would, according to these proposals, consist of no more than 50 people and the number of monitors from any one country would be limited to under five percent of the total. Observers would not be able to make public assessments of the vote until after government bodies had announced the official results. And, last but not least, the final report of the monitors would require the approval of all 56 OSCE members, which would give any government veto rights and make it impossible for the OSCE bodies to publish the results.

Apart from these proposals, meant to emasculate the OSCE, a gradual hollowing out of the election monitoring process of the OSCE had already begun as soon as 2002, when Russia started to set up parallel election monitoring organizations within the CSO, the CSTO and the CIS, three Russia-dominated organizations. The new motto became: let the blind control the blind. Let non-democratic countries monitor each other’s elections. The CIS sent about 100 observers to the December 2007 Duma elections in Russia. These monitors saw no irregularities and gave their blessing even when these elections were judged unfair by the OSCE.(15) The same happened again with the parliamentary elections in Belarus on September 28, 2008.

### **The Attack on the CFE Treaty**

A second premise of Medvedev’s peace conference is that, equally, the CFE Treaty is obsolete. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe that was signed on November 19, 1990, is one of the most important treaties for the security and stability in Europe. It has limited conventional military equipment in the region between the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals and has implemented confidence-building measures, such as prior notification of troop movements and military maneuvers, and surprise inspections. The Treaty established ‘central zone limits’ and regional ‘flank limits’ in order to prevent destabilizing force concentrations. The Russian flank ceilings were revised in the Flank

Agreement of 1996 in order to take into account the new situation after the demise of the Soviet Union. This gave Russia higher ceilings in the North Caucasus. On 19 November 1999 the 30 CFE State Parties signed in Istanbul the Adaptation Agreement to amend the CFE Treaty in order to take into account the new geo-strategic situation in Europe. In the Final Act of this agreement Russia committed itself to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. Because Russia did not fulfill this commitment the NATO countries did not ratify the new treaty. Russia thereupon 'suspended' the existing CFE Treaty on July, 13, 2007, a suspension that came into force 150 days later, which meant a unilateral breach of the treaty (according to which a 'suspension' is not possible). Russia considers itself no longer bound by the Northern and Southern Flank ceilings of the Treaty, which makes it possible to concentrate troops near the frontiers of the three Baltic states, as well as near Georgia and Ukraine. Russia equally withdrew from the systems of mutual monitoring and exchange of information, and no longer accepted inspection teams on Russian territory or the pre-announcement of movements of Russian troops.(16)

In fact Russia is killing those treaties that have proved to be of great importance for peace and security in Europe. The OSCE Treaty, as well as the CFE Treaty, contain concrete and detailed measures to prevent surprise attacks and to enhance mutual confidence on the European continent. To undermine these treaties and at the same time propose a great Pan-European Peace Conference along the lines of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which contained no detailed measures, but only vague declarations, is certainly not a way forward toward greater security in Europe. Even more so when this initiative comes from a country that unilaterally – outside the UN framework – recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two provinces of the sovereign republic of Georgia. A country that deliberately and conscientiously undermines international law seems not to be the appropriate initiator of an international peace conference.

### **First Reactions of the West**

The Russian propaganda offensive for the new security treaty has especially been directed to the big four 'friendly' EU member states: Italy, Germany, France, and Spain. Leaders of these countries have been invited to Moscow, Saint Petersburg, as well as the more pleasant Black Sea resort of Sochi. The political message that was delivered to them was mixed with generous offers of bilateral trade and investment opportunities.(17) This strategy has, so far, met with success. On a visit to Moscow on July 16, 2008, the Italian President, Giorgio Napolitano, already expressed his support for Medvedev's peace plan.(18) Moscow's project can equally count on the sympathy of the German Foreign Minister and SPD chancellor candidate Frank-Walter Steinmeier. On October, 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008, the Spanish Prime Minister José Zapatero, who was invited to Moscow, on a press conference openly

supported the idea to create in Europe a new security architecture. “It has to take into account the interests of Russia, Europe, as well as the whole world”, he said.(19) But the most important political support Medvedev has received up until now from French - and EU – President Nicolas Sarkozy at October 8, 2008 in Evian. Sarkozy not only wholeheartedly supported Medvedev’s proposal, but he went so far as to propose a special summit meeting of the OSCE to be held at the end of 2009 “to discuss (Russian) proposals and those of the European Union for new concepts of a pan-European defence.”(20) Sarkozy’s suggestion to use the OSCE as a platform for the conference has certainly been inspired by the Russian leadership. If the conference starts at the end of 2009, it will continue its activities during the year 2010. This is exactly the year that Kazakhstan will chair the OSCE. It will be the first time that a former Soviet state presides over this organization. The choice of Kazakhstan, a close ally of Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the CSTO, has been highly contested because the country lacks democratic credentials: so far the OSCE itself has failed to judge a single election in Kazakhstan free and fair.(21) But for Russia it will be the right chairman at the right moment.

### **How Should the West Respond?**

The question is: how should the West respond? First, something about the idea itself. The idea to organize a Euro-Atlantic security conference is, in itself, not new. In his book *The Grand Chessboard*, which was published in 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski had already come up with this idea. He proposed to build ‘perhaps sometime early in the next century’ a Trans-Eurasian Security System (TESS). “Such a transcontinental security agreement should embrace an expanded NATO – connected by a cooperative charter with Russia – and China as well as Japan.”(22) It is interesting that ten years ago Brzezinski had already proposed an enlargement of the security dialogue to include China. A difference with Medvedev’s proposal, however, is that he had also insisted that Japan would be invited. “Three-way American-Japanese-Chinese security talks could eventually involve more Asian participants,” wrote Brzezinski, “and later lead to a dialogue between them and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In turn, such a dialogue could pave the way for a series of conferences by all European and Asian states, thereby beginning the process of institutionalizing a transcontinental security system. In time, a more formal structure could begin to take shape, prompting the emergence of a Trans-Eurasian Security System that for the first time would span the entire continent.”(23)

The idea of a Eurasian security conference is, in itself, plausible if we take into account the important geopolitical shifts that have taken place in the last twenty years. But the West should first, remain united and, second, formulate the following preliminary demands:

1. If Russia insists that China should be invited for the conference, then the Western countries should insist that Japan should equally be invited. This would make it possible to end one of the last still remaining conflicts inherited from the Second World War: the unresolved question of the return of the Northern Territories to Japan. The occupation of the four Chishima (Kurile) islands by Russia is hindering a full normalization of the relationship between Russia and Japan.(24) A multilateral peace conference could be an appropriate forum to resolve this 'frozen conflict'. Russia would be asked to show the same flexibility it was able to show in the border conflict with China, when, on July 21 of this year, it signed a border agreement with China in which it ceded two islands at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers in Russia's Far East.

2. In his Evian speech on October 8, 2008, President Medvedev mentioned as the first of the five provisions of the new treaty that "The Treaty should clearly affirm the basic principles for security and intergovernmental relations in the Euro-Atlantic area. These principles include the commitment to fulfill in good faith obligations under international law; respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states (...)." The initiator of the new Treaty should be held to these principles *before* a conference can take place. This would mean that Russian troops would withdraw from Transnistria as was promised in the Final Act of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit. It would equally mean that Russia withdraws its troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia that are in excess of the number present before August 7, 2008. It would furthermore mean that Russia backtracks on its illegal and unilateral recognition of the independence of both Georgian provinces and works for an international UN-led solution for the breakaway provinces that respects the territorial integrity of Georgia. Especially the last precondition must be a *sine qua non*. Only by strictly adhering to agreements and principles of international law could Russia show its commitment to a multilateral approach and to a peaceful resolution of outstanding conflicts it says it wants to promote by the new treaty.

3. At August 31, 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev announced in a TV interview his five foreign policy priorities. The fourth of these priorities is particularly a cause of concern. "Protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country," he said. "Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need."(25) This self-proclaimed right of protecting the lives and dignity (where it is left to the Russian government to define what this 'dignity' is) of Russian citizens, '*wherever they may be*' means a return to pre World War II policies. It opens a Pandora box of possible interventions in neighboring states with Russian or Russian-speaking minorities.(26) Especially in combination with Russia's claim for an exclusive zone of influence in its Near Abroad this creates an explosive mixture. Before embarking on a security conference with Russia the Western participants must make clear that they cannot accept this stance and that the

protection of national minorities is the obligation of the respective state within which these minorities live and of the international community.

4. One of the reasons of the success of 'Helsinki', the first post World War II Pan-European Security Agreement, was that it formulated the respect for human rights which helped dissident voices and democratic movements to express themselves more freely in the former Soviet bloc. The Western countries should remember that in the long run a non-authoritarian and democratic Russia will be the best guarantee for a peaceful Europe and they should, therefore, be careful not to replace the existing OSCE that - still - values democratic values by a vague non-aggression pact à la Briand-Kellogg. The OSCE should remain a corner stone of a European security system and, possibly, given additional structures.<sup>(26)</sup>

According to *Moscow News* Medvedev would like to receive an answer of the Western countries on his proposal no later than in February 2009, when he will attend the annual security conference in Munich.<sup>(27)</sup> The EU member states - NATO and non-NATO members - should seriously study Medvedev's proposal. They should not react unilaterally, but co-ordinate their response with their trans-Atlantic partners – especially with the new American administration. They should be aware of the hidden objectives of Medvedev's proposal and only accept the proposal if Russia lives up to the standards of international law it pretends to adhere to and if there is a chance for a constructive outcome that creates a win-win situation for all the participants.

## NOTES

- (1) "President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev's Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders", Berlin, June 5, 2008, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department. Available at

[http://www.in.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/c080dc2ff8d93629c3257460003496c4?](http://www.in.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/c080dc2ff8d93629c3257460003496c4?)

- (2) The text of the Evian speech is available at

[http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/10/08/2159\\_type82912type82914\\_207457.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml)

- (3) The members of the CSTO are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
- (4) The collective defense provision is specified in Article 3 of the CSTO Treaty. The text of the treaty is available at [http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078\\_158780/5/9/13289.pdf](http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/5/9/13289.pdf)
- (5) The number of signatories of this pact – that was concluded outside the League of Nations – went up to 61. This is a very high number when we take into account that the League of Nations had only 54 members at the moment that the Pact was signed.
- (6) Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Seventieth Congress, Second Session, on the General Pact for the Renunciation of War, Signed at Paris, August 27, 1928 - December 7 and 11, 1928, p. 8. Available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/kbpact/kbhear.htm>
- (7) Ibid., p. 24
- (8) Ibid., p. 27.
- (9) Carl Schmitt, *Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte – Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht*, Berlin, 1991 (Duncker & Humblot) (first published in April 1939).
- (10) Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum*, Berlin (Duncker & Humblot), 1997, p. 256. (My translation, MHvH).
- (11) It was President Theodore Roosevelt who, in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1904, gave the doctrine a more offensive interpretation and threatened to intervene in cases that political movements endangered the repayments of debts to American creditors. Cf. Herfried Münkler, *Empires – The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States*, Cambridge (Polity Press), 2007, p. 94.
- (12) Cf. Carl Schmitt, *Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung*, o.c., p. 53. Cf. also Franz Neumann, *Behemoth – Struktur und Praxis des Nationalsozialismus 1933 – 1944*, Köln/Frankfurt am Main, 1973 (Europäische Verlagsanstalt), pp. 198 – 230.
- (13) Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary-General of the CPSU at that time, wrote an article in the *Pravda* of July, 15. 1968, in which he defended the doctrine of restricted national sovereignty for the members of the Warsaw Pact. This 'Brezhnev Doctrine' was used as a legitimation for the

military intervention of five members of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia on August, 21, 1968.

(14) Dmitry Medvedev, Berlin Speech, *oc.*, p. 3.

(15) Cf. Richard Weitz, *OSCE Maintains Role in Central Asia Despite Conflict with Russia*, 11/28/2007, published by 'Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst'. Available at <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4744/print>

(16) Cf. Vladimir Socor, *Kremlin would re-write or kill CFE Treaty*, Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 18, 2007. Available at: [http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article\\_id=2372298](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372298)

(17) So flew French Prime Minister, François Fillon, to Sochi on September 19, 2008, where he met Putin on the 7<sup>th</sup> International Investment Forum. They signed agreements on new bilateral projects in the field of high tech, energy, and space, including cooperation in developing the Shtokman gas field and a joint project to launch Soyuz spacecrafts from a French launching pad. Both prime ministers appeared on a press conference against the background of a Russian, French *and an EU flag*. This ostentatious show of *business as usual* at a moment that Russian occupation troops still were present in the Georgian heartland, was, at the very least, a sign of bad taste of the country that held the EU presidency.

(18) Cf. "Napolitano Backs New Security Pact", in *The St. Petersburg Times*, July 18, 2008.

(19) "Prem'er Ispanii prizval ES i RF zaklyuchit' novyi dogovor bezopasnosti", Russian Daily Internet Paper *Brjansk*, October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008.

(20) "Sarkozy and Medvedev call for new European security pact", Deutsche Presse Agentur, October 8, 2008.

(21) Cf. "Joining the club - Kazakhstan and the OSCE", *The Economist*, December 8, 2008. Despite warnings from Human Rights Watch that the chairmanship of Kazakhstan would undermine the credibility of the OSCE's democratic and human rights principles, in the end geopolitical considerations were decisive.

(22) Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Great Chessboard – American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York (HarperCollins Publishers), 1997, p. 208.

(23) *Ibid.*.

(24) Cf. Shigeki Hakamada e.a., “Nature of Russian State and Japan’s Strategy towards Russia”, *the 30<sup>th</sup> Policy Recommendations*, The Policy Council, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Tokyo, February 2008, pp. 10-11. The Soviet Union based its occupation of the Kurile islands on the Yalta Agreement, to which Japan was not a party. According to Japan Yalta violated the principles set out in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the Cairo Declaration of 1943 which rejected the legal right to demand a part of the territory from the vanquished party as a form of reparation.

(25) “Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Chanell One, Rossia, NTV”, Sochi, August 31, 2008. Available at [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850\\_type82912type82916\\_206003.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml) The other principles Medvedev mentioned were: the primacy of principles of international law; a multi-polar and not ‘single-pole’ world; avoiding confrontation with other countries; and a fourth principle, stating the existence of ‘regions in which Russia has privileged interests’.

(26) Zbigniew Brzezinski (o.c., p. 201) proposed to build additional structures into the OSCE, such as a ‘Security Committee’, composed of the US, Russia and some key European countries.

(27) “When Will the West Answer Medvedev?”, *Moscow News*, June 10, 2008.

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