Dr. Çinar ÖZEN
Department of International Relations
Gazi University, Ankara
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN
NON-EU NATO MEMBERS
The EU member states declared at the Cologne European Council in June 1999,
their "determination to play a full role on the international stage and to obtain
the necessary means and capabilities regarding a common European policy on security
and defence"(1) and furthermore they defined at the Helsinki Summit in December
1999 the guidelines of a future European security and defence policy. The objective
was to "create an autonomous capacity for the EU to take decisions and, where
NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military
operations in response to international crises"(2). This was a logical continuation
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), elaborated in the Maastricht
Treaty and the consequence of the Treaty of Amsterdam in which the enhancement
of the CFSP, including the development of a Common European Defence Policy,
was announced. The Amsterdam Treaty also provided the possibility to integrate
the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU. The European Council of Feira
developed this security and defence project and the Nice Summit declared the
advent of the European Security and Defence policy.
The elaboration of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the
EU is something new, resulting from the change in the European security environment
in the post-cold war era. It bears the capacity to influence deeply the European
security architecture and the transatlantic link. Therefore, this change will
have a great impact on the six European non-EU NATO members. The Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Iceland, Norway and Turkey will see the decline of their respective
roles in the new European security architecture, due to a change of the pivotal
operational role from NATO to the EU. Each of these six countries will be influenced
in a different degree by this change, due to its specific conditions.
In this lecture, I will try to examine the consequences of the ESDP on the
six European non-EU NATO members. For achieving this goal I will first determine
the principal guidelines of the ESDP and its implications for those six states,
and then I will explain the consultation and cooperation mechanisms with the
six, set up by the Nice Summit. Finally, I will analyse the specific conditions
of the six countries and their attitudes toward the ESDP.
Characteristics of the European Security and Defence Policy and Its Implications
on European Non-EU NATO Members
1. The Limitation of the ESDP to Petersberg Missions
The ESDP is bound to be limited to security and defence matters. The actual
ESDP framework gives the EU only a task in so-called Petersberg missions (which
consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking)(3) and not a role in territorial
or collective defence. Therefore it does not touch upon Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty and the Article V of the Brussels Treaty(4) (which offers a mutual assistance
guarantee). By incorporating the Petersberg missions into the Amsterdam Treaty
(Article 17/2) the EU has brought security and defence increasingly into the
orbit of EU activities. This has coincided with the changing nature of security
policy, in which non-military aspects play a more significant role(5). The importance
of civil and military humanitarian missions, such as peacekeeping and peacemaking,
has indeed risen dramatically.
The definition of threat, as it is perceived by the NATO members, has changed
in the last ten years. In the Cold War era, security policies of Western European
countries were generally oriented towards meeting politico-military threats.
In the post-Cold War era, such policies are generally directed towards conflict
prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking in regional conflicts(6). The new
strategic concept, adopted by the NATO Allies at the Washington Summit in April
1999, has underlined the appearance of complex new risks including "oppression,
ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order"(7). These
new threats demand new mechanisms, different from the mechanisms created for
the tasks of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. It was a very important fact,
to which no European State could remain indifferent. The recent Balkan developments
had shown the importance of this kind of tasks and mechanisms. Actually, with
the establishment of the ESDP, there is a possibility that the tasks of peacekeeping
and crisis management can be increasingly managed within the EU and not in NATO.
However, there is also the clause that for starting an EU-led operation, NATO
is to be engaged as a whole. On the other hand, the engagement of NATO as a
whole will depend on the EU countries which are at the same time NATO members.
For example, an EU country, which prefers an EU-led operation can block the
decision within NATO and impede the engagement of NATO.
The shift of control of Petersberg-type operations from NATO to the EU bears
the potential of excluding the non-EU NATO members, which are eager to play
a role in the new European security environment, from the new European security
decision-making process. The result of this could be the loss of influence by
the six European non-EU NATO members. Furthermore, they can envisage the decline
of their capacity to pursue and orient operations bearing a strategic importance
for their national interests. One has to keep in mind that EU-led military operations
can be conducted in Europe as well as on its periphery.
2. Incorporation of the WEU into the EU
The Amsterdam Treaty, in its article 17, contemplates "the possible integration
of the WEU into the Union as a conclusion of the European council decision".
At the WEU Ministerial Council in November 2000 in Marseille, the WEU member
states agreed to suspend the operational capacity of the WEU. Thus the WEU chose
a path toward gradual disappearance in operational matters and to remain as
a depository of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty whose execution remains
within NATO. As a result, the WEU chose to be only a significant forum and a
privileged place of exchanges on questions of security and defence for the Members
of Parliament of 28 countries within its Parliamentary Assembly(8).
On the other hand, the WEU could serve as a bridge between EU and NATO. WEU
was the main instrument of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI),
which was a developing process after the 1994 NATO Brussels Declaration and
the 1996 NATO Ministerial Meeting of Berlin(9), played a significant role in
establishing a European pillar in NATO. In the framework of ESDI, the WEU would
not detract from NATO, and as the implementation branch of the EU, it could
construct the operational wherewithal to conduct modest operations for the Union.
Using this logic, the WEU would be both a practical tool for EU security policy
and a buffer zone between NATO and the EU(10).
The WEU had also developed a differentiated and far-reaching system of participation
in its decision-making processes for States that are not full members. Declaration
No. 30 of the Maastricht Treaty gives a legal basis for the non-EU NATO members
to join to the WEU as associate members and to participate fully in the WEU's
activities. Especially after the WEU's Ministerial Councils of Berlin in July
1997 and of Erfurt in November 1997, the associate members (the six European
non-EU NATO members) had obtained the right to participate fully, in accordance
with their statute, in all missions of Petersberg carried out by the WEU(11).
With the merger of the WEU and EU, this network of relationships will be abolished
and the rights of non-EU members states to participate in EU decision-making
will be diminished. These countries will suffer a net loss concerning the degree
of participation in security and defence matters, due to the decision to integrate
the operational functions of the WEU into the EU(12). Once the WEU ceases to
exist and the WEU's functions are transferred to the EU Council, it is not clear
whether WEU Associate members will have any influence on the EU decision-making
3. Keeping Autonomous Decision-Making Capacity to Launch
and to Conduct EU-led Military Operations
The first overt use of the word "autonomous" in any European security blueprint
was in the Saint-Malo declaration(14). France and Britain, in December 1998,
in the Saint-Malo declaration, stated that "the Union must have the capacity
for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide
to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises"(15).
After the Franco-British Joint Declaration in Saint-Malo, the 15 member states
of the EU adopted the formula and declared their determination to develop an
autonomous capacity to take decisions on security and defence issues in the
Cologne(16), Helsinki(17) and Feira(18) Summits. Furthermore, at the Feira Summit
the EU members announced that "these decisions will be taken within the single
institutional framework and will respect European Community competences and
ensure inter-pillar coherence". All of this indicates that the European Security
and Defence Policy is developing in the framework of the European Union juridical
order and within the acquis communautaire.
In this context it is possible to say that the use of the term "autonomy" means
in fact the intention of the EU to act separately from NATO and there is an
impression that this terminology is chosen not to use the term "independently"
which is much stronger than "autonomy". In reality, the leaders of the EU wanted
to ensure the political control and the strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg
operations, so that the EU could decide upon, and conduct, such operations autonomously(19).
This is a clear sign of abandoning the concept of ESDI. The concept of ESDI
had been created by NATO to construct a European pillar within NATO. The approach,
which aimed at protecting European decision-making autonomy in security matters,
has limited the role of NATO concerning Petersberg-type operations and contradicts
the ESDI concept. The NATO members acknowledged at the Washington Summit of
1999 "the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action so that
it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole
is not engaged"(20).
The adoption of both the concept of "autonomy" and "avoiding unnecessary duplication"
is an observable contradiction. In order to establish an autonomy in decision-making,
the EU has to procure the core assets needed to undertake autonomous action.
In this framework the term "unnecessary" bears great importance. The result
of the misuse of this term is a risk to jeopardise the principle of "non-duplication".
The effects of duplication in the European security system will be quite negative
on non-EU NATO members. For this reason, NATO members have underlined several
times the importance of the non-duplication principle.
The adoption of autonomous decision-making causes problems as to the non-discrimination
principle. The European non-EU NATO members are highly sensible on this critical
issue. These countries worry about an eventual exclusion from European security
forums. According to Heisbourg, "the result of the autonomy principle might
be some discrimination between members and non-members of the EU" and this is
"by definition inevitable in the EU organizational framework"(21).
The autonomy principle raises also some serious problems for the use of NATO
assets in EU-led operations. Some non-EU NATO members refuse the automatic guarantee
of access to NATO assets for EU operations (especially Turkey) and these countries
insist on case-by-case permission for EU access to NATO assets. Ömur Orhun,
Director General for International Security Affairs of the Turkish Foreign Ministry,
stresses that the "Feira decisions did not make the necessary distinction between
autonomous EU-led operations and those involving NATO assets"(22).
4. Establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force
At the December 1999 Helsinki European Council a "headline goal" for a Rapid
Reaction Force was set. Deployable within sixty days and sustainable for at
least one year in the field, this 50-60.000 force, equivalent to an army corps
along with its air and naval components, must be ready by 2003 for a full range
of Petersberg missions(23). These forces should be militarily sustaining the
necessary command, control, intelligence capabilities, logistics, and other
combat support units. It is worth saying that this multinational force will
be pooled when necessary. The plan excludes a standing integrated army(24).
In the Helsinki Summit Conclusions, the option of a "European army" is clearly
excluded by stating that "this process does not imply the creation of a European
army" (para. 27).
According to the Feira Summit Conclusions "the commitment of national assets
by member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decision".
The final decision, whether to involve troops when the EU faces an international
crisis, will remain firmly with the national governments.
At the Feira Summit, the EU members decided also that, at the end of 2000,
the "Capabilities Commitment Conference" should convene. After the General Affairs
Council, held in Brussels on 20 November 2000, the EU Defence and Foreign Ministers
announced a declaration called the "Military Capabilities Declaration" and on
21 November 2000 they met with the defence ministers of the countries that have
applied for membership and the non-EU European members of NATO willing to supply
troops to the EU force.
At the Brussels General Affairs Council, the ministers announced the need to
pool more than 100.000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft, as well
as 100 vessels to carry out the different types of crisis-management missions
within the headline goal(25). As Heisbourg indicates, "a sustainable corps-equivalent
force in the field implies an overall reservoir more than three times the size
of the field force, not to mention the corresponding air and naval components"(26).
Creating a pool of that size is a long and costly task, implying major budget
re-ordering. One cannot forget that the EU countries have a tendency to diminish
their defence spending. At this point, the contribution offered by the six non-EU
European NATO members to the European Union's new Rapid Reaction Force gains
a special importance.
At the Feira European Council the principle to "encourage the non-EU European
NATO Members to contribute to improving Europe's capabilities" had been agreed
upon. On the other hand, at the Brussels General Affairs Council, the EU ministers
defined the offers of the six as a "complementary commitment to improving European
Capabilities". The course of events will probably show, in a short period of
time, what means "complementary". The six non-EU European NATO member countries,
especially Turkey, declare frequently their concern about being excluded from
that EU Rapid Reaction Force.
5. Getting Free Access to NATO Assets
The final characteristic of ESDP we observed is the request of the EU to have
free access to NATO assets. At the Summits of Cologne and Helsinki the EU countries
clarified that the EU-led military operations can be managed with or without
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The need to use NATO assets stem from
the lack of military capabilities of the EU to support even the most modest
of military missions(27). Some analysts argue that the EU is only able to handle
small-scale operations without recourse to NATO assets at the moment(28). To
change this picture the EU countries have to raise their defence expenditures
and augment the share of defence in their budgets. However, for instance, the
unwillingness to raise defense spending is observable and as a conclusion of
this fact the recourse to the NATO assets is becoming indispensable(29).
However, it is an other fact that part of the NATO assets has been created
by EU member states, which are at the same time NATO members and that these
assets have been put within the integrated military structure of NATO by those
countries. As a result, while the EU lacks the necessary assets to conduct a
military operation, although it wants to conduct a Petersberg-type military
mission, part of its military assets remains inside NATO. The EU, in this context,
wants that "pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets" are being made
available for the duration of the EU-led operations and that it will have a
guaranteed permanent access to the planning capacities of NATO.
The request of the EU to use the NATO assets, as explained above, has met with
objections from the non-EU European NATO members, especially from Turkey. The
EU countries want to have an automatic guarantee of access to NATO assets for
EU-led military operations in a crisis. Especially France argues that, if assets
are not guaranteed, command nuclei will not be completed. Consequently France
and other EU countries want free access to NATO and, inevitably, US assets whenever
The demand of automatic access to NATO assets for EU-led military operations
causes some sensibilities among the non-EU European NATO members, due to the
principle of autonomous decision-making and the single institutional framework,
declared by the EU, relating to ESDP issues. Especially Turkey insists on case-by-case
permission or acceptance of the full inclusion of the contributing countries
into the EU security decision-making process(31). It must not be forgotten that
in NATO's institutional framework a consensus of the NATO allies is indispensable
for the use of NATO assets in an EU-led operation.
Arrangements Concerning the Six European Non-EU NATO Members According to
the Conclusions of the Nice Summit
Permanent Consultation Arrangements in a Non -Crisis Phase
This is the arrangement to assure the participation of the non-EU European
NATO members and the candidates of the EU in the ESDP. These arangements are
developed on the basis of consultation and cooperation. The Nice Summit pursued
what was agreed at the Helsinki and Feira Summits by creating the mechanisms
of the non-crisis phase. The consultation arrangements, which were agreed upon
at the Nice Summit, are schematically as follows:
- At least two meetings will take place under each Presidency in EU + 15 format,
concerning questions related to the ESDP and their possible implications for
the countries concerned.
- At least two meetings will take place under each Presidency with the participation
of the non-EU European NATO members in EU + 6 format.
- A ministerial meeting associating the 15 and the 6 will be organized under
- Two meetings at least on the level of the representatives in the Military
Committee, and exchanges at the level of the military experts (in particular
those relating to the development of the objectives of capacities) will be
pursued with the non-EU European NATO members and the other candidates for
accession to the EU.
- At least two briefings will be organized during each Presidency with the
15 and 6, accredited to the staff of the EU which will be used as point of
It has to be noted that these meetings will supplement those which are held
within the framework of the political dialogue relating to the CFSP. It has
been also indicated in the Nice Summit Conclusions that supplementary meetings
can be organized, if the circumstances require it and the proposals of meetings
coming from the States concerned will be taken into consideration by the Presidencies
of the EU.
The Six and the Decision-Making in Operational Phase
The Nice Summit Conclusions give priority to the EU's institutional framework
in the operational phase. This is the natural implementation of principles,
such as autonomy and the single institutional framework of the EU, adopted at
the Helsinki and Feira Summits. In this context the place of the six is limited
in regard to the high level and intensive consultation process. A Contributors
Committee was also set up to this end.
It is possible to explain the operational phase decision-making schematically
- The Council decides on the strategic military options and approves the concept
of operation after having taken into consideration the results of consultations
with third countries likely to take part in the operation.
- If the EU uses NATO assets and capabilities, each of the six European non-EU
NATO members has the right to participate, if they wish so.
- If the EU does not use NATO assets, the participation of the six will depend
upon the decision taken by the Council.
- Operational planning for an action with an access to the means and the capacities
of NATO will be carried out within the bodies of planning of the Alliance.
The six will be implied in this planning according to methods determined within
- In the case of an autonomous action of the EU operational planning, carried
out within one of the European staff of strategic level, the six can set up
the liaison officers to the European staffs of strategic level. This will
allow an exchange of information on operational planning and the contributions
- The countries concerned, confirm the level and the quality of their national
contribution to the Conference of generation of forces. Following this conference,
operation will be formally launched and the Committee of the Contributors
will be set up.
- The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) will be responsible for the
political control and strategic direction of the operation.
- All the States which have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation
by deploying significant military forces, will have the right to participate
in the day conduct of that operation.
- The Council, after consultations with the participating States, within the
Committee of the Contributers, makes the decision to stop the operation.
This explanation implies that the Nice Summit does not include fully the European
non-EU NATO members in the European security decision-making process. Although
some significant consultation mechanisms are developed in case NATO assets and
capabilities are being used, it is uncertain whether this will satisfy the six,
and especially Turkey, which has been expecting a full inclusion. The process
of operation demonstrates clearly the will of the EU to keep the strategic and
political control of the operation, while allowing the six to participate in
day-to-day decision-making. This is another critical point, which would result
in the exclusion of the six from the EU decision-making process concerning the
conduct of Petersberg-type operations.
The Committee of the Contributors
According to the Nice Summit Conclusions, this is a committee consisting of
the members of the EU and the other contributors. It means that the six also
have the right to participate in the committee of the contributors, if they
deploy forces significant for the operation. Presided by the EU representatives,
the Committee of the Contributors has two functions: to assure detailed information
on the operation in the field for the contributor countries and to transmit
the opinions and recommendations of the contributor countries to the EU Political
and Security Committee and to the EU Military Committee.
It is obvious that this committee is built up as a bridge to give the opportunity
to non-EU contributor countries to participate in the unfolding of the EU-led
operations. On the other hand, as the members of the EU insisted on restricting
the role of the non-EU contributors to consultation, the committee is planned
to be only a platform ensuring exchange of views and cooperation between the
EU member contributors and the non-EU member contributors. Thus it is to be
noted that this does not ensure a real participation of the non-EU contributor
countries in the decision-making of the EU-led operations.
The Six European Non-EU NATO Members Vis à Vis the European Security and
The evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy will influence especially
the six countries which are members of NATO but not of the EU. Those are the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Iceland, Norway and Turkey. However, each of
these six countries will be influenced in a different degree. It is possible
to differentiate three groups.
In the first group are the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These three
are candidates for EU membership which are closest to adhesion. The EU decided
at the Helsinki Summit to welcome these states from the end of 2002. It means
that these countries have the chance to become full members of the EU before
the full implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy.
The second group consists of Norway and Iceland. These two countries decided
voluntarily not to join the EU. They can be full members in a relatively short
time, if they decide to do so. Their exclusion from the European Security and
Defence Policy is the logical result of their political choice and they know
that to be part of it depends on their political will. These factors weaken
the degree of their reaction towards the European Security and Defence Policy
and its negative impact.
In the third group is Turkey. This country has a position sui generis in the
European integration process. It has started its association negotiations with
the EU in 1959, became associated in 1963, and made an application for membership
in 1987. Turkey is today the country which is the farthest from full membership
among the candidate countries. The obstacles preventing Turkey's membership
are not the subject of this article, but they influence deeply the attitude
of Turkey vis-à-vis the ESDP.
In this context, Turkey is worried about losing the influential position it
had in the Cold War, and a possible exclusion, in time, of the new European
security structure. The end of the Cold War changed the central security role
played by Turkey during the Cold War era. Turkey saw itself slipping politically
towards the periphery of Europe in the post-Cold War era. The strategic importance
of Turkey has been changed in nature. Turkey is still strategically an important
country for Europe. Thus, Turkey has a potential, paradoxically, both to contribute
to, and to damage the European strategic interests in the European periphery.
This fact gives Turkey an important position. Turkey searches its place in the
new European security architecture. It is clear that Turkey is unhappy with
the decline of the NATO's role in the post-Cold War era and is not satisfied
with the solution found inside the ESDP.
Turkey today is the most ardent and insistent adversary of the ESDP. This leads
Turkey to pursue a policy to block inside NATO EU's request to have free access
to NATO assets and capabilities. Turkey's Defence Minister, Sabahattin Cakmakoglu,
explained this attitude clearly by saying that "Turkey could block the use of
NATO equipment and forces by the ESDP if it is not allowed to take part in the
new force" and one should not forget that the contribution of Turkey to that
force should guarantee it a place in the decision-making process of the ESDP(32).
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated that "Turkey has received unfair treatment
from the EU over the ESDP so far". Ecevit, answering questions from journalists
after a meeting with NATO Secretary General George Robertson, said that "Turkey
is a NATO member, but it is not in the EU, and we have been asked not to play
a role in the decision-making, even if NATO facilities are used in military
operations." He added: "I am not satisfied with Robertson's proposals"(33).
On the other hand, on 21 November 2000, at the Capabilities Commitment Conference,
Turkey proposed a commitment to contribute to EU's rapid reaction force with
a brigade-sized force including a mechanised infantry brigade headquarters and
five army battalions, as well as two frigates, a submarine and five other ships,
and two squadrons of F-16 fighters(34). The contribution, equating roughly to
4,000-5,000 troops, was the largest from non-EU countries, with Norway offering
3.500, Slovakia 450, and Estonia an infantry battalion(35). Although Turkey
indicated its willingness to take part in the new force, it is keen to ensure
that, as a long-standing NATO member, it is not excluded from decisions affecting
European security, especially in its own region.
The evolution of the ESDP bears a potential negative impact on the six European
non-EU NATO members. However, only Turkey expresses a strong fear concerning
its exclusion from the European security structure. The attitude of Turkey toward
the ESDP will undoubtedly have significant effects on NATO-EU relations and
influence deeply the development of the ESDP.
With the evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU has
chosen a different path from the European security arrangements developed inside
NATO in the post-Cold War era. This will certainly have a deep impact on the
European security architecture. However, especially the six European non-EU
NATO members, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Iceland, Norway and Turkey,
will be negatively influenced by this change. In this lecture I tried to analyse
the consequences of the ESDP for these six countries.
First of all I tried to demonstrate the characteristics of the ESDP, as well
as its implications for the six. The characteristics of ESDP that we observed
are the "limitation of the ESDP to Petersberg missions", "the incorporation
of the WEU into the EU", "keeping an autonomous decision-making capacity to
launch and to conduct EU-led operations" and, finally, "the establishment of
a Rapid Reaction Force". All of them will result in diminishing the role of
the six European non-EU NATO countries in the area of post-Cold War security
issues. However, it is worth noting that this is is a theoretical effect. In
fact each of the six will be influenced in a different degree, due to its specific
After the analysis of the characteristics of the ESDP I explained the arrangements
of participation of the six in the ESDP according to the conclusions of the
Nice Summit. This implicates an intense and detailed consultation and cooperation
mechanism. As a conclusion I can say that this does not mean the full inclusion
of the six in the ESDP decision-making process.
Finally, I analysed the different attitudes of each of the six countries vis-à-vis
the ESDP. It is clear that the strongest opposition comes from Turkey. I observed
that, on the one hand, the imminent full EU membership of the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, and, on the other hand, the political will of Iceland and
Norway to stay outside of the EU, have caused a moderate reaction of these countries
towards the negative impact of the ESDP. The real consequences of a theoretical
negative impact have only been felt by Turkey.Today, Turkey is alone to resist
the consequences of the developing ESDP. This loneliness weakens the power of
that resistance. The change in the European security architecture is certain
and the process has started. We will see in time how the new European security
architecture will be shaped.
N O T E S
1. Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, http://www.europa.eu.int
2. Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, http://www.europa.eu.int
3. The WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers met on 19 June 1992 at Petersberg near
Bonn and issued a declaration to consider the implementation of the Maastricht
declarations. This Petersberg Declaration was a major step in defining the operational
role of the WEU. The so- called "Petersberg Missions" are the new operational
tasks given to the WEU by this declaration. See Petersberg Declaration, WEU
Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, http://www.weu.int
4. P. van Ham, "Europe's Common Defence Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic
Relationship, in: Security Dialogue, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2000, p. 225.
5. E. Kirchner and J. Sperling, "Will Form Lead to Function? Institutional Enlargement
and the Creation of a European Security and Defence Identity", in: Contemporary
Security Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 2000, p. 24.
6. Ö. Orhun, "European Security and Defence Identity - Common European Security
and Defence Policy: A Turkish Perspective", in: Perceptions, September-November
2000, pp. 115-116.
7. See the Alliance's Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington,
D.C., 23-24 April 1999, http://www.nato.int
8. Marseille Declaration, WEU Ministerial Council, 13 November 2000, http://www.weu.int
9. P. Schmidt, "ESDI : Separable but not Separate?" in: NATO Review, Spring/Summer
2000, p. 12.
10. A. Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force", in: International
Journal, Spring 2000, p. 255.
11. Declaration of the WEU on the Role of the Western European Union and Its
Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, WEU Ministerial
Council, Brussels, 22 July 1997, http://www.weu.int,
12. P. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 13.
13. G. Aybet, "NATO's Developing Role in Collective Security", Ankara 1999,
14. J. Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative", in: Survival,
Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 43.
15. Joint Declaration on European Defence, Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo,
4 December 1998, Par. 2.
16. Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, Annex III,
European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy and
Defence, Par. 1/2.
17. Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999,
18. Presidency Report to the Feira European Council on Strengthening the Common
European Policy on Security and Defence, Brussels, 15 June 2000.
19. A. Moens, op. cit., p. 261.
20. Washington Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of States and Government
Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.,
24 April 1999, http://www.nato.int Par. 9/a.
21. F. Heisbourg, "European Defence Takes a Leap Forward", in : NATO Review,
Spring/Summer 2000, p. 10.
22. Ö. Orhun, op. cit., p. 121.
23. F. Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity", in:
Survival,Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 5; Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki
European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Par. 28.
24. J. Alistair and K. Shepherd, "Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defence
Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability?" in: European
Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 17.
25. Defense: Military Capabilities Commitments Declaration, General Affairs
Council, Brussels, 20 November 2000, http://www.europa.eu.int
26. F. Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity", pp.
27. J. Alistair and K. Shepherd, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
28. J. Howorth, op. cit., p. 39.
29. Ibid., p. 25.
30. A. Moens, op. cit. p. 260.
31. Financial Times, 22 November 2000.
32. Turkish Daily News, 23 November 2000.
33. Turkish Daily News, 25 November 2000.
34. Financial Times, 22 November 2000.