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Dr. Çinar ÖZEN

Department of International Relations
Gazi University, Ankara

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN NON-EU NATO MEMBERS

Introduction

The EU member states declared at the Cologne European Council in June 1999, their "determination to play a full role on the international stage and to obtain the necessary means and capabilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence"(1) and furthermore they defined at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 the guidelines of a future European security and defence policy. The objective was to "create an autonomous capacity for the EU to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises"(2). This was a logical continuation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), elaborated in the Maastricht Treaty and the consequence of the Treaty of Amsterdam in which the enhancement of the CFSP, including the development of a Common European Defence Policy, was announced. The Amsterdam Treaty also provided the possibility to integrate the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU. The European Council of Feira developed this security and defence project and the Nice Summit declared the advent of the European Security and Defence policy.

The elaboration of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU is something new, resulting from the change in the European security environment in the post-cold war era. It bears the capacity to influence deeply the European security architecture and the transatlantic link. Therefore, this change will have a great impact on the six European non-EU NATO members. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Iceland, Norway and Turkey will see the decline of their respective roles in the new European security architecture, due to a change of the pivotal operational role from NATO to the EU. Each of these six countries will be influenced in a different degree by this change, due to its specific conditions.

In this lecture, I will try to examine the consequences of the ESDP on the six European non-EU NATO members. For achieving this goal I will first determine the principal guidelines of the ESDP and its implications for those six states, and then I will explain the consultation and cooperation mechanisms with the six, set up by the Nice Summit. Finally, I will analyse the specific conditions of the six countries and their attitudes toward the ESDP.

Characteristics of the European Security and Defence Policy and Its Implications on European Non-EU NATO Members

   1. The Limitation of the ESDP to Petersberg Missions

The ESDP is bound to be limited to security and defence matters. The actual ESDP framework gives the EU only a task in so-called Petersberg missions (which consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking)(3) and not a role in territorial or collective defence. Therefore it does not touch upon Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the Article V of the Brussels Treaty(4) (which offers a mutual assistance guarantee). By incorporating the Petersberg missions into the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 17/2) the EU has brought security and defence increasingly into the orbit of EU activities. This has coincided with the changing nature of security policy, in which non-military aspects play a more significant role(5). The importance of civil and military humanitarian missions, such as peacekeeping and peacemaking, has indeed risen dramatically.

The definition of threat, as it is perceived by the NATO members, has changed in the last ten years. In the Cold War era, security policies of Western European countries were generally oriented towards meeting politico-military threats. In the post-Cold War era, such policies are generally directed towards conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking in regional conflicts(6). The new strategic concept, adopted by the NATO Allies at the Washington Summit in April 1999, has underlined the appearance of complex new risks including "oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order"(7). These new threats demand new mechanisms, different from the mechanisms created for the tasks of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. It was a very important fact, to which no European State could remain indifferent. The recent Balkan developments had shown the importance of this kind of tasks and mechanisms. Actually, with the establishment of the ESDP, there is a possibility that the tasks of peacekeeping and crisis management can be increasingly managed within the EU and not in NATO. However, there is also the clause that for starting an EU-led operation, NATO is to be engaged as a whole. On the other hand, the engagement of NATO as a whole will depend on the EU countries which are at the same time NATO members. For example, an EU country, which prefers an EU-led operation can block the decision within NATO and impede the engagement of NATO.

The shift of control of Petersberg-type operations from NATO to the EU bears the potential of excluding the non-EU NATO members, which are eager to play a role in the new European security environment, from the new European security decision-making process. The result of this could be the loss of influence by the six European non-EU NATO members. Furthermore, they can envisage the decline of their capacity to pursue and orient operations bearing a strategic importance for their national interests. One has to keep in mind that EU-led military operations can be conducted in Europe as well as on its periphery.

   2. Incorporation of the WEU into the EU

The Amsterdam Treaty, in its article 17, contemplates "the possible integration of the WEU into the Union as a conclusion of the European council decision". At the WEU Ministerial Council in November 2000 in Marseille, the WEU member states agreed to suspend the operational capacity of the WEU. Thus the WEU chose a path toward gradual disappearance in operational matters and to remain as a depository of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty whose execution remains within NATO. As a result, the WEU chose to be only a significant forum and a privileged place of exchanges on questions of security and defence for the Members of Parliament of 28 countries within its Parliamentary Assembly(8).

On the other hand, the WEU could serve as a bridge between EU and NATO. WEU was the main instrument of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which was a developing process after the 1994 NATO Brussels Declaration and the 1996 NATO Ministerial Meeting of Berlin(9), played a significant role in establishing a European pillar in NATO. In the framework of ESDI, the WEU would not detract from NATO, and as the implementation branch of the EU, it could construct the operational wherewithal to conduct modest operations for the Union. Using this logic, the WEU would be both a practical tool for EU security policy and a buffer zone between NATO and the EU(10).

The WEU had also developed a differentiated and far-reaching system of participation in its decision-making processes for States that are not full members. Declaration No. 30 of the Maastricht Treaty gives a legal basis for the non-EU NATO members to join to the WEU as associate members and to participate fully in the WEU's activities. Especially after the WEU's Ministerial Councils of Berlin in July 1997 and of Erfurt in November 1997, the associate members (the six European non-EU NATO members) had obtained the right to participate fully, in accordance with their statute, in all missions of Petersberg carried out by the WEU(11).

With the merger of the WEU and EU, this network of relationships will be abolished and the rights of non-EU members states to participate in EU decision-making will be diminished. These countries will suffer a net loss concerning the degree of participation in security and defence matters, due to the decision to integrate the operational functions of the WEU into the EU(12). Once the WEU ceases to exist and the WEU's functions are transferred to the EU Council, it is not clear whether WEU Associate members will have any influence on the EU decision-making process(13).

   3. Keeping Autonomous Decision-Making Capacity to Launch and to Conduct EU-led Military Operations

The first overt use of the word "autonomous" in any European security blueprint was in the Saint-Malo declaration(14). France and Britain, in December 1998, in the Saint-Malo declaration, stated that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises"(15). After the Franco-British Joint Declaration in Saint-Malo, the 15 member states of the EU adopted the formula and declared their determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions on security and defence issues in the Cologne(16), Helsinki(17) and Feira(18) Summits. Furthermore, at the Feira Summit the EU members announced that "these decisions will be taken within the single institutional framework and will respect European Community competences and ensure inter-pillar coherence". All of this indicates that the European Security and Defence Policy is developing in the framework of the European Union juridical order and within the acquis communautaire.

In this context it is possible to say that the use of the term "autonomy" means in fact the intention of the EU to act separately from NATO and there is an impression that this terminology is chosen not to use the term "independently" which is much stronger than "autonomy". In reality, the leaders of the EU wanted to ensure the political control and the strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations, so that the EU could decide upon, and conduct, such operations autonomously(19).

This is a clear sign of abandoning the concept of ESDI. The concept of ESDI had been created by NATO to construct a European pillar within NATO. The approach, which aimed at protecting European decision-making autonomy in security matters, has limited the role of NATO concerning Petersberg-type operations and contradicts the ESDI concept. The NATO members acknowledged at the Washington Summit of 1999 "the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged"(20).

The adoption of both the concept of "autonomy" and "avoiding unnecessary duplication" is an observable contradiction. In order to establish an autonomy in decision-making, the EU has to procure the core assets needed to undertake autonomous action. In this framework the term "unnecessary" bears great importance. The result of the misuse of this term is a risk to jeopardise the principle of "non-duplication". The effects of duplication in the European security system will be quite negative on non-EU NATO members. For this reason, NATO members have underlined several times the importance of the non-duplication principle.

The adoption of autonomous decision-making causes problems as to the non-discrimination principle. The European non-EU NATO members are highly sensible on this critical issue. These countries worry about an eventual exclusion from European security forums. According to Heisbourg, "the result of the autonomy principle might be some discrimination between members and non-members of the EU" and this is "by definition inevitable in the EU organizational framework"(21).

The autonomy principle raises also some serious problems for the use of NATO assets in EU-led operations. Some non-EU NATO members refuse the automatic guarantee of access to NATO assets for EU operations (especially Turkey) and these countries insist on case-by-case permission for EU access to NATO assets. Ömur Orhun, Director General for International Security Affairs of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, stresses that the "Feira decisions did not make the necessary distinction between autonomous EU-led operations and those involving NATO assets"(22).

   4. Establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force

At the December 1999 Helsinki European Council a "headline goal" for a Rapid Reaction Force was set. Deployable within sixty days and sustainable for at least one year in the field, this 50-60.000 force, equivalent to an army corps along with its air and naval components, must be ready by 2003 for a full range of Petersberg missions(23). These forces should be militarily sustaining the necessary command, control, intelligence capabilities, logistics, and other combat support units. It is worth saying that this multinational force will be pooled when necessary. The plan excludes a standing integrated army(24). In the Helsinki Summit Conclusions, the option of a "European army" is clearly excluded by stating that "this process does not imply the creation of a European army" (para. 27).

According to the Feira Summit Conclusions "the commitment of national assets by member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decision". The final decision, whether to involve troops when the EU faces an international crisis, will remain firmly with the national governments.

At the Feira Summit, the EU members decided also that, at the end of 2000, the "Capabilities Commitment Conference" should convene. After the General Affairs Council, held in Brussels on 20 November 2000, the EU Defence and Foreign Ministers announced a declaration called the "Military Capabilities Declaration" and on 21 November 2000 they met with the defence ministers of the countries that have applied for membership and the non-EU European members of NATO willing to supply troops to the EU force.

At the Brussels General Affairs Council, the ministers announced the need to pool more than 100.000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft, as well as 100 vessels to carry out the different types of crisis-management missions within the headline goal(25). As Heisbourg indicates, "a sustainable corps-equivalent force in the field implies an overall reservoir more than three times the size of the field force, not to mention the corresponding air and naval components"(26). Creating a pool of that size is a long and costly task, implying major budget re-ordering. One cannot forget that the EU countries have a tendency to diminish their defence spending. At this point, the contribution offered by the six non-EU European NATO members to the European Union's new Rapid Reaction Force gains a special importance.

At the Feira European Council the principle to "encourage the non-EU European NATO Members to contribute to improving Europe's capabilities" had been agreed upon. On the other hand, at the Brussels General Affairs Council, the EU ministers defined the offers of the six as a "complementary commitment to improving European Capabilities". The course of events will probably show, in a short period of time, what means "complementary". The six non-EU European NATO member countries, especially Turkey, declare frequently their concern about being excluded from that EU Rapid Reaction Force.

   5. Getting Free Access to NATO Assets

The final characteristic of ESDP we observed is the request of the EU to have free access to NATO assets. At the Summits of Cologne and Helsinki the EU countries clarified that the EU-led military operations can be managed with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The need to use NATO assets stem from the lack of military capabilities of the EU to support even the most modest of military missions(27). Some analysts argue that the EU is only able to handle small-scale operations without recourse to NATO assets at the moment(28). To change this picture the EU countries have to raise their defence expenditures and augment the share of defence in their budgets. However, for instance, the unwillingness to raise defense spending is observable and as a conclusion of this fact the recourse to the NATO assets is becoming indispensable(29).

However, it is an other fact that part of the NATO assets has been created by EU member states, which are at the same time NATO members and that these assets have been put within the integrated military structure of NATO by those countries. As a result, while the EU lacks the necessary assets to conduct a military operation, although it wants to conduct a Petersberg-type military mission, part of its military assets remains inside NATO. The EU, in this context, wants that "pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets" are being made available for the duration of the EU-led operations and that it will have a guaranteed permanent access to the planning capacities of NATO.

The request of the EU to use the NATO assets, as explained above, has met with objections from the non-EU European NATO members, especially from Turkey. The EU countries want to have an automatic guarantee of access to NATO assets for EU-led military operations in a crisis. Especially France argues that, if assets are not guaranteed, command nuclei will not be completed. Consequently France and other EU countries want free access to NATO and, inevitably, US assets whenever they choose(30).

The demand of automatic access to NATO assets for EU-led military operations causes some sensibilities among the non-EU European NATO members, due to the principle of autonomous decision-making and the single institutional framework, declared by the EU, relating to ESDP issues. Especially Turkey insists on case-by-case permission or acceptance of the full inclusion of the contributing countries into the EU security decision-making process(31). It must not be forgotten that in NATO's institutional framework a consensus of the NATO allies is indispensable for the use of NATO assets in an EU-led operation.

Arrangements Concerning the Six European Non-EU NATO Members According to the Conclusions of the Nice Summit

Permanent Consultation Arrangements in a Non -Crisis Phase

This is the arrangement to assure the participation of the non-EU European NATO members and the candidates of the EU in the ESDP. These arangements are developed on the basis of consultation and cooperation. The Nice Summit pursued what was agreed at the Helsinki and Feira Summits by creating the mechanisms of the non-crisis phase. The consultation arrangements, which were agreed upon at the Nice Summit, are schematically as follows:

  • At least two meetings will take place under each Presidency in EU + 15 format, concerning questions related to the ESDP and their possible implications for the countries concerned.
  • At least two meetings will take place under each Presidency with the participation of the non-EU European NATO members in EU + 6 format.
  • A ministerial meeting associating the 15 and the 6 will be organized under each Presidency.
  • Two meetings at least on the level of the representatives in the Military Committee, and exchanges at the level of the military experts (in particular those relating to the development of the objectives of capacities) will be pursued with the non-EU European NATO members and the other candidates for accession to the EU.
  • At least two briefings will be organized during each Presidency with the 15 and 6, accredited to the staff of the EU which will be used as point of contact.

It has to be noted that these meetings will supplement those which are held within the framework of the political dialogue relating to the CFSP. It has been also indicated in the Nice Summit Conclusions that supplementary meetings can be organized, if the circumstances require it and the proposals of meetings coming from the States concerned will be taken into consideration by the Presidencies of the EU.

The Six and the Decision-Making in Operational Phase

The Nice Summit Conclusions give priority to the EU's institutional framework in the operational phase. This is the natural implementation of principles, such as autonomy and the single institutional framework of the EU, adopted at the Helsinki and Feira Summits. In this context the place of the six is limited in regard to the high level and intensive consultation process. A Contributors Committee was also set up to this end.

It is possible to explain the operational phase decision-making schematically as follows:

  • The Council decides on the strategic military options and approves the concept of operation after having taken into consideration the results of consultations with third countries likely to take part in the operation.
  • If the EU uses NATO assets and capabilities, each of the six European non-EU NATO members has the right to participate, if they wish so.
  • If the EU does not use NATO assets, the participation of the six will depend upon the decision taken by the Council.
  • Operational planning for an action with an access to the means and the capacities of NATO will be carried out within the bodies of planning of the Alliance. The six will be implied in this planning according to methods determined within NATO.
  • In the case of an autonomous action of the EU operational planning, carried out within one of the European staff of strategic level, the six can set up the liaison officers to the European staffs of strategic level. This will allow an exchange of information on operational planning and the contributions considered.
  • The countries concerned, confirm the level and the quality of their national contribution to the Conference of generation of forces. Following this conference, operation will be formally launched and the Committee of the Contributors will be set up.
  • The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) will be responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the operation.
  • All the States which have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces, will have the right to participate in the day conduct of that operation.
  • The Council, after consultations with the participating States, within the Committee of the Contributers, makes the decision to stop the operation.

This explanation implies that the Nice Summit does not include fully the European non-EU NATO members in the European security decision-making process. Although some significant consultation mechanisms are developed in case NATO assets and capabilities are being used, it is uncertain whether this will satisfy the six, and especially Turkey, which has been expecting a full inclusion. The process of operation demonstrates clearly the will of the EU to keep the strategic and political control of the operation, while allowing the six to participate in day-to-day decision-making. This is another critical point, which would result in the exclusion of the six from the EU decision-making process concerning the conduct of Petersberg-type operations.

The Committee of the Contributors

According to the Nice Summit Conclusions, this is a committee consisting of the members of the EU and the other contributors. It means that the six also have the right to participate in the committee of the contributors, if they deploy forces significant for the operation. Presided by the EU representatives, the Committee of the Contributors has two functions: to assure detailed information on the operation in the field for the contributor countries and to transmit the opinions and recommendations of the contributor countries to the EU Political and Security Committee and to the EU Military Committee.

It is obvious that this committee is built up as a bridge to give the opportunity to non-EU contributor countries to participate in the unfolding of the EU-led operations. On the other hand, as the members of the EU insisted on restricting the role of the non-EU contributors to consultation, the committee is planned to be only a platform ensuring exchange of views and cooperation between the EU member contributors and the non-EU member contributors. Thus it is to be noted that this does not ensure a real participation of the non-EU contributor countries in the decision-making of the EU-led operations.

The Six European Non-EU NATO Members Vis à Vis the European Security and Defence Policy

The evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy will influence especially the six countries which are members of NATO but not of the EU. Those are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Iceland, Norway and Turkey. However, each of these six countries will be influenced in a different degree. It is possible to differentiate three groups.

In the first group are the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These three are candidates for EU membership which are closest to adhesion. The EU decided at the Helsinki Summit to welcome these states from the end of 2002. It means that these countries have the chance to become full members of the EU before the full implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy.

The second group consists of Norway and Iceland. These two countries decided voluntarily not to join the EU. They can be full members in a relatively short time, if they decide to do so. Their exclusion from the European Security and Defence Policy is the logical result of their political choice and they know that to be part of it depends on their political will. These factors weaken the degree of their reaction towards the European Security and Defence Policy and its negative impact.

In the third group is Turkey. This country has a position sui generis in the European integration process. It has started its association negotiations with the EU in 1959, became associated in 1963, and made an application for membership in 1987. Turkey is today the country which is the farthest from full membership among the candidate countries. The obstacles preventing Turkey's membership are not the subject of this article, but they influence deeply the attitude of Turkey vis-à-vis the ESDP.

In this context, Turkey is worried about losing the influential position it had in the Cold War, and a possible exclusion, in time, of the new European security structure. The end of the Cold War changed the central security role played by Turkey during the Cold War era. Turkey saw itself slipping politically towards the periphery of Europe in the post-Cold War era. The strategic importance of Turkey has been changed in nature. Turkey is still strategically an important country for Europe. Thus, Turkey has a potential, paradoxically, both to contribute to, and to damage the European strategic interests in the European periphery. This fact gives Turkey an important position. Turkey searches its place in the new European security architecture. It is clear that Turkey is unhappy with the decline of the NATO's role in the post-Cold War era and is not satisfied with the solution found inside the ESDP.

Turkey today is the most ardent and insistent adversary of the ESDP. This leads Turkey to pursue a policy to block inside NATO EU's request to have free access to NATO assets and capabilities. Turkey's Defence Minister, Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, explained this attitude clearly by saying that "Turkey could block the use of NATO equipment and forces by the ESDP if it is not allowed to take part in the new force" and one should not forget that the contribution of Turkey to that force should guarantee it a place in the decision-making process of the ESDP(32). Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated that "Turkey has received unfair treatment from the EU over the ESDP so far". Ecevit, answering questions from journalists after a meeting with NATO Secretary General George Robertson, said that "Turkey is a NATO member, but it is not in the EU, and we have been asked not to play a role in the decision-making, even if NATO facilities are used in military operations." He added: "I am not satisfied with Robertson's proposals"(33).

On the other hand, on 21 November 2000, at the Capabilities Commitment Conference, Turkey proposed a commitment to contribute to EU's rapid reaction force with a brigade-sized force including a mechanised infantry brigade headquarters and five army battalions, as well as two frigates, a submarine and five other ships, and two squadrons of F-16 fighters(34). The contribution, equating roughly to 4,000-5,000 troops, was the largest from non-EU countries, with Norway offering 3.500, Slovakia 450, and Estonia an infantry battalion(35). Although Turkey indicated its willingness to take part in the new force, it is keen to ensure that, as a long-standing NATO member, it is not excluded from decisions affecting European security, especially in its own region.

The evolution of the ESDP bears a potential negative impact on the six European non-EU NATO members. However, only Turkey expresses a strong fear concerning its exclusion from the European security structure. The attitude of Turkey toward the ESDP will undoubtedly have significant effects on NATO-EU relations and influence deeply the development of the ESDP.

Conclusion

With the evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU has chosen a different path from the European security arrangements developed inside NATO in the post-Cold War era. This will certainly have a deep impact on the European security architecture. However, especially the six European non-EU NATO members, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Iceland, Norway and Turkey, will be negatively influenced by this change. In this lecture I tried to analyse the consequences of the ESDP for these six countries.

First of all I tried to demonstrate the characteristics of the ESDP, as well as its implications for the six. The characteristics of ESDP that we observed are the "limitation of the ESDP to Petersberg missions", "the incorporation of the WEU into the EU", "keeping an autonomous decision-making capacity to launch and to conduct EU-led operations" and, finally, "the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force". All of them will result in diminishing the role of the six European non-EU NATO countries in the area of post-Cold War security issues. However, it is worth noting that this is is a theoretical effect. In fact each of the six will be influenced in a different degree, due to its specific conditions.

After the analysis of the characteristics of the ESDP I explained the arrangements of participation of the six in the ESDP according to the conclusions of the Nice Summit. This implicates an intense and detailed consultation and cooperation mechanism. As a conclusion I can say that this does not mean the full inclusion of the six in the ESDP decision-making process.

Finally, I analysed the different attitudes of each of the six countries vis-à-vis the ESDP. It is clear that the strongest opposition comes from Turkey. I observed that, on the one hand, the imminent full EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and, on the other hand, the political will of Iceland and Norway to stay outside of the EU, have caused a moderate reaction of these countries towards the negative impact of the ESDP. The real consequences of a theoretical negative impact have only been felt by Turkey.Today, Turkey is alone to resist the consequences of the developing ESDP. This loneliness weakens the power of that resistance. The change in the European security architecture is certain and the process has started. We will see in time how the new European security architecture will be shaped.

N O T E S

1. Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, http://www.europa.eu.int
2. Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, http://www.europa.eu.int
3. The WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers met on 19 June 1992 at Petersberg near Bonn and issued a declaration to consider the implementation of the Maastricht declarations. This Petersberg Declaration was a major step in defining the operational role of the WEU. The so- called "Petersberg Missions" are the new operational tasks given to the WEU by this declaration. See Petersberg Declaration, WEU Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, http://www.weu.int
4. P. van Ham, "Europe's Common Defence Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship, in: Security Dialogue, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2000, p. 225.
5. E. Kirchner and J. Sperling, "Will Form Lead to Function? Institutional Enlargement and the Creation of a European Security and Defence Identity", in: Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 2000, p. 24.
6. Ö. Orhun, "European Security and Defence Identity - Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Turkish Perspective", in: Perceptions, September-November 2000, pp. 115-116.
7. See the Alliance's Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., 23-24 April 1999, http://www.nato.int
8. Marseille Declaration, WEU Ministerial Council, 13 November 2000, http://www.weu.int
9. P. Schmidt, "ESDI : Separable but not Separate?" in: NATO Review, Spring/Summer 2000, p. 12.
10. A. Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force", in: International Journal, Spring 2000, p. 255.
11. Declaration of the WEU on the Role of the Western European Union and Its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, WEU Ministerial Council, Brussels, 22 July 1997, http://www.weu.int, Par. 29.
12. P. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 13.
13. G. Aybet, "NATO's Developing Role in Collective Security", Ankara 1999, p. 55.
14. J. Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative", in: Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 43.
15. Joint Declaration on European Defence, Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998, Par. 2.
16. Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, Annex III, European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy and Defence, Par. 1/2.
17. Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Par. 27.
18. Presidency Report to the Feira European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Brussels, 15 June 2000.
19. A. Moens, op. cit., p. 261.
20. Washington Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of States and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999, http://www.nato.int Par. 9/a.
21. F. Heisbourg, "European Defence Takes a Leap Forward", in : NATO Review, Spring/Summer 2000, p. 10.
22. Ö. Orhun, op. cit., p. 121.
23. F. Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity", in: Survival,Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 5; Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Par. 28.
24. J. Alistair and K. Shepherd, "Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defence Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability?" in: European Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 17.
25. Defense: Military Capabilities Commitments Declaration, General Affairs Council, Brussels, 20 November 2000, http://www.europa.eu.int
26. F. Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity", pp. 10-11.
27. J. Alistair and K. Shepherd, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
28. J. Howorth, op. cit., p. 39.
29. Ibid., p. 25.
30. A. Moens, op. cit. p. 260.
31. Financial Times, 22 November 2000.
32. Turkish Daily News, 23 November 2000.
33. Turkish Daily News, 25 November 2000.
34. Financial Times, 22 November 2000.
35. Ibid.

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